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CASE COMMENTS
apply. Evidence of additional non-contradictory terms could be sub-
mitted to the trier of fact for his consideration in determining the
total agreement of the parties. It is for this reason that the UCC stand-
ard, and particularly its interpretation by the New York court in Hunt
Foods, or the adoption of the Corbin standard, may lead to the decline
of the parol evidence rule.
JOHN E. KELLY III
COURT ENFORCEMENT OF UNION FINES
The historical means of punishing union members who violate
union rules have been limited to expulsion from the union and
fines carrying the threat of expulsion for nonpayment.1 With the
threat of expulsion confronting him, a member contemplating viola-
tion of a union rule would be faced with a value judgment. Should
he decide to disregard the union regulation, he would risk the loss
of his union membership and the benefits flowing from that mem-
bership. The powerful union thus would have more control over
the conduct of its members than would a weaker union whose mem-
bers might well be willing to accept the risk of losing its relatively
few benefits.
Local 248, UAW v. Natzke2 adds a new aspect to the relationship
between a weak union and its members. The case concerned state
court enforcement of a fine imposed by the union upon members
who had returned to work during a strike. In Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Company v. NLRB 3 the Supreme Court held that the
the union's suit against Natzke was not an unfair labor practice under
the Taft-Hartley Act. Following this decision the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Natzke enforced the fine, thus giving the union a new
means of enforcing its discipline.
While the general attitude of the courts has been to avoid liti-
gating matters concerning internal union problems, 4 various legal
fictions have been used to justify intervention in this area. However,
the purpose of such intervention has been to protect the union member
"See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 197 (1967) (concurring
opinion).
"36 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 6o2 (1967).
3388 U.S. 175 (1967).
'For a discussion of this judicial attitude see Chafee, The Internal Affairs of
Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1930).
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from an abuse of power by the union.5 The prevalent fiction used
by the courts in this area has been the contract theory whereby the
member is said to enter into a contract with the union, the terms of
which are said to be expressed in the union's constitution and bylaws.0
Natzke, however, shows a new application of the contract theory
of union membership in that this "legal fabrication," used origi-
nally for the protection of the union member,7 is used to his detri-
ment by the judgment ordering him to pay the union-imposed fine.8
While one other case, also decided by the Wisconsin court, has
enforced a union fine under these circumstances, 9 the majority of
courts have consistently refused such attempts at collection, feeling
that payment, if made at all, must necessarily be by the voluntary
action of the member.10
Natzke arose during an economic strike called by Locals 248 and
401 of the UAW against Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company.
One hundred and seventy-two members of Local 248 and two Local
401 members were charged with "conduct unbecoming a union mem-
ber" for crossing picket lines and returning to work during the
strike. After a hearing before a union trial committee and the ap-
proval of their respective local memberships, fines were assessed
against the strike breakers ranging from $2o to $1oo. Local 248 then
sent a letter to each of its fined members as a reminder of the fine
'For a general discussion see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951).
0"This contractual conception of the relation between a member and his
union widely prevails in this country...." International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958). In Gonzales the union member was awarded
damages under the contract theory for wages lost as well as for mental and
physical suffering due to -his being wrongfully expelled from the union in violation
of his rights under the union's organic law.
7NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 207 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
"The only other theory used by the courts in the past to justify intervention
was the property theory whereby the union member was said to have a property
right in his union membership which the courts would protect against an abuse
of union power. This theory was geared solely to protecting the union member
and could not be used against his interest as was the contract theory in Natzke.
For a further discussion of both theories see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1951).
"Local 756, UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958).
"0"The right of a private corporation [a trade association] to impose a fine
is one thing, and the right to sue thereon and employ judicial process for its
collection is quite another.... [P]ayment, if made at all, must necessarily be by the
voluntary action of the member." Merchants Ass'n v. Coat House of William
M. Schwartz, Inc., 152 Misc. 13o, 273 N.Y.S. 317, 321 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1934). See
also Local 629, Retail Clerks v. Christiansen, 67 Wash. 2d 29, 4o6 P.2d 327 (1965):
Local 188, United Glass Workers v. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d 640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965);
Continental Turpentine & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval Stores Co., 244 Miss. 465, 142
So. 2d 200 (1962).
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owed to the union, but rather than threatening the usual penalty of
expulsion for failure to pay, the letter stated that a failure to pay
would result in a civil action against the recalcitrant member for
its collection. The letter also pointed out the Local 756, UAW v.
Woychikll decision in which court enforcement of a similar union
fine had been upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
When more than half of the fined workers refused to pay the
amounts assessed against them, Local 248 brought a test suit against
Natzke, a strike breaker fined $ioo, to determine whether the courts
would enforce such a fine. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company,
the employer of the fined workers, then brought an action before the
NLRB12 alleging that the two unions had violated § 8(b)(i)(A) of the
Taft-Hartley Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise of his right
not to participate in a concerted activity. The Board's view, however,
was that the union's fining the workers and bringing suits to collect
the fines was entirely within the union-member relationship and was
protected by a proviso to § 8(b)(i)(A). This proviso states that the
section "shall not impair the right of a labor organization to pre-
scribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein...."13
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to follow
the Board's decision and held that this activity violated § 8(b)(i)(A)
and was not protected by the proviso.1 4 Then in a 5-4 decision the
Supreme Court of the United States adopted the Board's result,' 5 but
reached its decision on the grounds that the union's activity did not
115 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958).
"Local 248, UAW & Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
"Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b)(i)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 15 8(b)(i)(A) (1964). The relevant provision of § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act reads:
Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities
... and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such ac-
tivities....
Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
However, the relevant provision of § 8 of the Act reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(i) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title [§ 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act]:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organi-
zation to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
Id. § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
2Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7 th Cir. 1966). For a further
criticism of the Board's holding in the case see, Comment, 8(bXIXA) Limitations
upon the Right of a Union to Fine Its Members, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 74 (1966).
zNLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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"restrain or coerce" the fined workers within the meaning of the Act.
The Court therefore found it unnecessary to rely on the proviso as
the Board had done and left undecided the question of whether the
union's activity might also be protected under the proviso. 16
Natzke was still pending when the Supreme Court decided ,that the
union had not committed an unfair labor practice. The question
was then left to the Wisconsin court as to whether it would affirm
the lower court's judgment that the fine be paid. The union mem-
ber's contention that state labor policy was against such enforcement
was rejected by the court on the ground that there might be federal
preemption in -this area. The Wisconsin court reasoned that since
state courts are without jurisdiction to enforce any state policy which
varies with the policy of the NLRB, 17 and since it was "clear that
court enforcement of the instant fine is consonant with federal labor
policy as determined by [the] board,"' 8 federal policy should control.
The court cited the Board's Allis-Chalmers'9 decision as indicating
this federal policy. The paradox here, however, is that the Board by
basing its decision on the proviso to § 8(b)(i)(A) has in effect resolved
that it was precluded from deciding the question because it involved
internal union discipline. According to Supreme Court decisions20
and the Court's own interpretation of the legislative history of the
proviso, 21 the Board is specifically precluded from entertaining such
a question. Therefore, it would seem there could be no federal policy
as enunciated by the Board on a question the Board has held it was
precluded from deciding under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act. In truth the court must be said to be relying on federal labor
policy as announced by the Supreme Court. In the Court's Allis-
Chalmers decision there might well be an indication of a future
finding of federal preemption in this area because of the Court's
reliance upon a strained interpretation of § 8(b)(i)(A) to justify its
decision and thus an avoidance of classifying the union's aotivity as
protected by the proviso.
Relying on Supreme Court dictum in Allis-Chalmers that there is
10Id. at 196.
17Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
1836 Wis. 2d 237, 153 N.W.2d 602, 607 (1967).
1D149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964).
'See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620
(1958).
21"[§ 8(b)(i)(A)] states that nothing in the section shall 'impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or re-
tention of membership therein....' Senator Holland offered the proviso during
debate and Senator Ball immediately accepted it, stating that it was not the
intent of the sponsors in any way to regulate the internal affairs of unions." NLRB
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 191 (1967) (emphasis added).
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an analogy between the union-member contract and the ordinary
commercial contract, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Natzke accepted
the premise that "general principles of contract law govern" 22 the
case. But in reaching its decision the court failed to consider many
principles of contract law which have a bearing on the case, and on
the one contract question it did consider, adopted a most doubtful
view.
The question in Natzke was whether the union should be allowed
to use the court as a means of enforcing its fine when such a method
of collection was not provided for in the union's constitution or by-
laws. The court held that the general rule applicable to the ordinary
contract is that the parties will not be restricted to those methods pro-
vided for in the contract in case of breach, and that a contract will not
be construed as taking away a common law remedy unless that result is
imperatively required.23 Following this rule Natzke held that the
union should not be disallowed court enforcement of its fines.
The Natzke decision is directly opposed to the view taken in Local
r88, United Glass Workers v. Seitz,24 which disallowed a union suit
to collect a fine because this means of collection was not provided
for in the union's organic law. The Seitz approach of strictly constru-
ing the contract against -the union would seem to indicate the better
rule. The majority of courts has always construed the contract strictly
against the union allowing it to punish only those offenses specifically
provided for in the organic law2 5 and to impose no greater penalty
than provided therein.26 This approach is supported by general con-
tract law. However analogous the union-member contract might be
to an ordinary contract, it is in one sense more analogous to the in-
surance contract. The person seeking union membership has no
ability to bargain as to the terms of the agreement. He must simply
accept the union's constitution and bylaws upon becoming a member.
The universal rule with regard to such contracts of adhesion has been
to construe them strictly against the party who has the exclusive
choice as to terms.27 The Wisconsin courts have consistently recogniz-
=153 N.W.2d at 609.
wId.
'65 Wash. 2d 640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965). Accord, Local 629, Retail Clerks v.
Christiansen, 67 Wash. 2d 29, 406 P.2d 327 (1965).
nSee, e.g., Sullivan v. Barrows, 303 Mass. 197, 21 N.E.2d 275 (1939); McGinley
v. Milk & Ice Cream Salesmen, 351 Pa. 47, 4o A.2d 16 (1944).
OE.g., Dingwall v. Railway Employees, 4 Cal. App. 565, 88 P. 597 (igo6); see
Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713 (1943).
2See, e.g., 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 7401 at 57 (1943). "mhe language
of insurance policies is selected by one of the parties alone, and the language
employed by that party should be construed against it."
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ed and applied this rule with regard to insurance contracts.28 How-
ever, Natzke apparently did not consider that the more valid contract
rule might be to construe the terms of the contract against the union
which had exclusive choice as to its terms.
The only case which supports Natzke is the prior holding in
Woychik. There also the court failed to consider the validity of con-
struing a contract against a party which had no choice as to the
terms, and allowed the union the remedy of court enforcement when
this means of collection was not specified in ,the union's constitution
or bylaws. Apparently, the only other case holding that a union fine
is enforceable in court is Master Stevedores' Association v. Walsh,29
an 1867 decision of a New York Court of Common Pleas. However,
Walsh can be distinguished because there the union member had
specifically agreed to court enforcement of a fine; the remedy was
provided for in a bylaw of the union.3 0 In all cases where such a
remedy was not provided in the union organic law, the New York rule
has been that such fines are not enforceable in court.31 It is submitted
therefore that the majority rule, and by far the better rule, is to limit
the union's ability to sue for the enforcement of a fine to the case
where the union members have agreed to this method of collection,
that is, by making the appropriate amendment to the union's organic
law.
Another contractual issue which should have been considered was
that the workers had no choice as to whether they would join the
union. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the
contractual relationship in Allis-Chalmers to be "the result not of
individual voluntary choice but of the.., union security provision
in the contract under which a substantial minority of the employees
may have been forced into membership."3 2 Although the Supreme
Court in Allis-Chalmers felt -that an inquiry into what motivated the
contract was not important in deciding whether the union had violated
the Taft-Hartley Act,33 this would seem to be a most important issue
in determining whether such a contract is enforceable. The courts
2See, e.g., Harker v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 2d 537, 137 N.W.2d
895 (1965).
12 Daly 1, (C.P.N.Y. 1867).
'Old. at 2.
'E.g., American Men's & Boys' Clothing Mfrs'. Ass'n v. Proser, 19o App.
Div. 164, 179 N.Y.S. 207 (1919); Merchants' Ass'n v. Coat House of William M.
Schwartz, Inc., 152 Misc. 130, 273 N.Y.S. 317 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1934).
'385 F.2d at 660.
'"[T]he relevant inquiry here is not what motivated a member's full mem-
bership but whether the Taft-Hartley amendments prohibited disciplinary measures
against a full member who had crossed his union's picket line." 388 U.S. at 196.
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have always been willing to give protection to one who has been the
subject of duress or undue influence in entering into a contract, 34 and
this would seem a very valid consideration with regard to a contract
made compulsory by the union security agreement.
Another question to be considered in such a contract is whether
the terms are too vague to be enforced. Uncertainty of terms has often
been held to avoid the ordinary commercial contract.35 While courts
tend to lean against holding contracts unenforceable on grounds of
vagueness,36 the basic requirement remains that the -terms of the con-
tract leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties intended.3 7
Natzke however failed to consider whether the avoidance of "conduct
unbecoming a union member"3 8 is a reasonably definite indication
of the performance required of a member under the union-member
contract.
The union also has the power to change a member's rights and
benefits without his consent.3 9 Such a right given to one party under
the terms of a contract has consistently been held to be grounds for
avoidance.40 Under the Natzke approach of treating the relationship
between the member and the union as one involving something
analogous to an ordinary commercial contract, the decision might well
have been against the enforcement of the contract had the court
considered this basic contract principle.
Another question could have been the nature of the $oo fine
sought to be collected by the union. Under contract law damages are
assessed for the purpose of putting the injured party in as good a
position as he would have been had the contract not been breached.4 1
3'NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 208 (1967) (dissenting
opinion). See 5 S. WiLuLsroN, CONTRAcrs ch. 47 (rev. ed. 1937).
sSee Klimek v. Perisich, 231 Ore. 71, 371 P.2d 956 (1962); Trammell v. Morgan,
8o Ohio L. Abs. 251, 158 N.E.2d 541 (Ct. App. 1957); Laseter v. Pet Dairy Prods.
Co., 246 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1957).
-See Burrow v. Timmsen, 223 Cal. App. 2d 283, 35 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1963); 1
A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 95, at 400 (1963).
'1-Witt v. Realist, Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962) (Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized certainty of terms as a requirement of a valid con-
tract).
3For a discussion of the various vague clauses commonly used in union
constitutions and bylaws see Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND.
LAB. REL. REV. 483, 505 (1950).
3See, e.g., Dyer v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 182 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 195o); Horwitz
v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753, 341 Ill. App. 383, 94 N.E.2d 95 (1950).
See, Matthias, Power to Amend Fraternal Insurance Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REV.
281 (1938).
"See, e.g., Nebraska Gas : Elec. Co. v. City of Stromsburg, 2 F.2d 518 (8th
Cir. 1924); iA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 (1963).
'See, e.g., Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); 5 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrs
§ 1002 (1964).
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While the parties may provide for liquidated damages in the contract,
these must be reasonable in amount and must be a realistic estimate
of actual contemplated damages. 42 If these requirements are not met
the amount will be considered a penalty, inserted into the contract
to intimidate the parties into performing, and will not be enforced.
43
Natzke failed to consider that a fine by its very nature is a penalty
rather than an attempt to gain compensation for the wrong done.
44
Further, the union's motive to intimidate the workers into compliance
with its commands was shown by the union's threat of fines of "up
to $ioo a day" to be imposed on those members who continued to work
during the strike.
Failing to consider any of these general principles of contract
law under which the contract might have been avoided, Natzke con-
cluded that "a binding obligation in the form of a debt" was created
when the union fined the workers, and that this debt would be en-
forced by the court. General principles of contract law would certainly
command that a vaguely worded contract, into which the worker was
required to enter as a condition of employment and as to the terms
of which he had no choice, falls short of the requirements for en-
forceability. Disregarding the universal rule, Natzke construed the
contract in favor of the party that had exclusive control as to its
terms and allowed the union a method of collection not agreed to
in -the contract. Further, the fine sought to be collected would cer-
tainly be struck down as a penalty under general contract principles.
The decision violates the past policy of the courts and the framers
of the Taft-Hartley Act of not interfering in internal union problems,
and also is based apparently on what must be deemed an incomplete
and erroneous interpretation of the law. The weak union, whose mem-
bers in the past might well have chosen to be expelled rather than
strike, is given under Natzke a powerful weapon with which to secure
obedience from its members. This method of enforcement is much
more valuable to the weak union than is expulsion which has the
obvious disadvantage of depleting the union membership. The aver-
age worker will be able to afford neither the fines nor the legal ex-
1
2
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACrS § 339 (1932).
4 "It should be borne in mind ... that a penalty imposed by the terms of a
contract on the party committing a breach thereof is not enforceable either in
equity or at law. A penalty is provided for the purpose of terrorizing a party
to a contract into complying with its terms." Shields v. Early, 132 Miss. 282, 95
So. 839, 841 (1923). Accord, Continental Turpentine & Rosin Co. v. Gulf Naval
Stores Co., 244 Miss. 465, 142 So. 2d 200 (Miss. 1962).
"Crooker v. United States, 325 F.2d 318, 321 (8th Cir. 1963); McHugh v. Placid
Oil Co., 2o6 La. 511, 19 So. 2d 221, 227 (1944).
